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Particular Reasons*
Selim Berker
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM MONISM TO PLURALISM TO
PARTICULARISM
According to contemporary physics, there are four fundamental forces:
the strong nuclear, weak nuclear, electromagnetic, and gravitational.
One of the greatest successes of twentieth-century physics was the re-
alization that the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces could be
uniﬁed into one—that they could be understood as two aspects of a
single electroweak force. This discovery led to attempts at formulating
a ‘grand uniﬁed theory’, as it came to be called, that would unify the
three forces other than gravity. And now the search is on for an even
more ambitious theory, a so-called theory of everything uniting all four
fundamental forces. Perhaps some version of string theory will produce
such a theory; perhaps some other, as yet unthought of theory will do
the trick. But although progress has been hampered by our current lack
of experimental evidence for the hypotheses being proposed, most prac-
ticing physicists are conﬁdent that a uniﬁed theory of the four funda-
mental forces is out there to be found.
There is a long-standing tradition in ethics with similar aspirations.
On this approach, ethics is seen as involving a search for a grand uniﬁed
theory of the moral realm, a quest for a “supreme principle of morality”
(as Kant called it) that would constitute a theory of everything with
respect to right and wrong. This single, universal principle could then
be used to discover which of the actions available to us in a given
circumstance are right and which are wrong and also to justify (both
to ourselves and to others) why, exactly, the right actions are right and
the wrong ones are wrong. The two best-known attempts at such a
* For helpful discussions of or comments on earlier versions of this article, many
thanks to Jake Beck, Alex Byrne, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan,NedHall,CasparHare,Richard
Holton, Christine Korsgaard, Bernhard Nickel, Nic Southwood, Robert Stalnaker, Eric
Swanson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Steve Yablo, SethYalcin,andanaudienceattheAustralian
National University. Many thanks also to two anonymous referees (one of whom identiﬁed
himself as Michael Ridge) and to the associate editors of Ethics.110 Ethics October 2007
principle are Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Bentham’s principle of
utility, but this tradition lives on to this day, with many contemporary
Kantians and consequentialists, among others, actively searching for
what they take to be the most plausible version of a grand uniﬁed theory
of morality.
In the past century a growing number of moral philosophers have
expressed dissatisfaction with this monist tradition according to which
there must be a single fundamental principle of morality. Often inﬂu-
enced by Aristotle, these critics ﬁnd the monist principles thus far pro-
posed unbearably crude and contend that any attempt to reduce mo-
rality to a single principle will inevitably leave something out. Monism
seems to assume that there exists a moral algorithm, and if only we
knew it, we could turn the crank and deduce for any given situation
what we should and should not do.
1 But, these critics insist, morality
isn’t the sort of thing that can be reduced to an algorithm; it isn’t the
sort of thing that could in principle be programmed into a computer.
Rather, what is supposedly needed to arrive at the correct moral verdict
in a given situation is “moral wisdom”—a kind of sensitivity to the mor-
ally relevant considerations present in the case at hand and an ability
to properly judge the right thing to do in light of those considerations.
Among the philosophers sympathetic to this sort of criticism of the
monist tradition, some have chosen to embrace a pluralist approach to
ethics such as that found in W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duties or
in some (but not all) forms of virtue ethics, where instead of one solitary
moral principle there is posited to be a plurality of basic principles—
an “unconnected heap of duties,” to use David McNaughton’s apt ex-
pression,
2 that are all equally fundamental. These differing duties can
in principle conﬂict, but in such cases there are claimed to be no ﬁnitely
codiﬁable rules dictating which duty trumps or outweighs the others,
for otherwise the basic principles together with the weighing rules could
be conjoined into a single master principle. Instead, what is allegedly
needed in cases of conﬂict is the ability to accurately judge whether,
say, one’s duty of beneﬁcence to perform some action outweighs one’s
duty of justice to avoid it or whether it would be better in this situation
to be honest than to be loyal. The hope is that by allowing for a plurality
of equally fundamental moral principles we can better cover the entire
moral landscape, while at the same time providing an ineliminable role
for moral judgment in deciding what one ought to do in a given cir-
cumstance.
1. Note my use of the word ‘seems’ in this sentence: I take no stand in this article
on whether monist theories really are committed to a judgment-free moral algorithm.
2. David McNaughton, “An Unconnected Heap of Duties?” Philosophical Quarterly 46
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In recent years, though, an even more radical break with the monist
tradition has begun to develop.
3 According to what has come to be
known as “moral particularism,” even the pluralist’s search for a mul-
titude of basic moral principles is in vain. It’s not that we need seven
or twenty-seven or even 207 fundamental moral principles to fully cap-
ture the moral realm; rather, the particularist insists that no ﬁnite num-
ber of ﬁnite, exceptionless principles could account for all the truths
there are about right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice. In the
particularist’s eyes, it’s judgment all the way down: judgment as to which
features of a given situation are morally relevant and judgment as to
how the features that are morally relevant play off each other to deter-
mine what one should and should not do in that situation. If the par-
ticularist is right, any attempt to reduce morality to principles, even the
sort of pro tanto principles appealed to by Rossian pluralists, will inevi-
tably lead to error: the features that make something good are just so
complicated, the conditions under which an action is right just so var-
iegated, and the properties that make a person virtuous just so nuanced
that the moral realm resists capture by any ﬁnite number of ﬁnite prin-
ciples. Therefore, the pluralist’s quest for a disconnected heap of duties
is just as misguided as the monist’s dream of a grand uniﬁed moral
theory.
Such is the particularist’s challenge to both monist and pluralist
approaches to ethics. But it’s one thing to have a sneaking suspicion
that there are no substantive moral principles—one thing to place one’s
bets, as it were, on none ever being found—and quite another thing to
adequately establish that this must be so. The main particularist strategy
is to argue for their claims about principles by ﬁrst attempting to secure
3. See Jonathan Dancy, “On Moral Properties,” Mind 90 (1981): 367–85, “Ethical
Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties,” Mind 92 (1983): 530–47, Moral Reasons
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), “The Particularist’s Progress,” in Moral Particularism, ed. Brad
Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 130–56, and Ethics without Prin-
ciples (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004); Ulrik Kihlbom, Ethical Particularism: An Essay on Moral
Reasons (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002); Mark Lance and Margaret Olivia Little,
“Defeasibility and the Normative Grasp of Context,” Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 435–55, “De-
fending Moral Particularism,” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. James Dreier
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 305–21, and “Particularism and Antitheory,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed.DavidCopp(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006),567–94;
Margaret Olivia Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Partic-
ularism, 276–304, “On Knowing the ‘Why’: Particularism andMoralTheory,”HastingsCenter
Report 31 (2001): 32–40, and “Wittgensteinian Lessons on Moral Particularism,” in Slow
Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics, ed. Carl Elliott
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 161–80; David McNaughton, Moral Vision
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); and David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Unprincipled
Ethics,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, 256–75. The possibility of such aposition
was ﬁrst pointed out and given the name ‘particularism’ in R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 18.112 Ethics October 2007
certain claims about reasons.
4 Particularists begin by taking for granted
a widely held framework according to which reasons for action are the
fundamental normative units whose interactions determine, through a
metaphorical balancing of the weight of reason, all other normative
properties of actions. They then argue that there is irremediable context
dependence, both in how reasons for action arise out of the nonnor-
mative features of a given situation and in how the reasons that are
present combine to determine one’s overall duties. From this they con-
clude that any proffered principle stating what in general grounds rea-
sons for action, or how in general reasons for action play off each other
to determine other normative notions, must either admit of exceptions
or be inﬁnite in length. Given their general framework, it follows that
there do not exist—or, at least, that we should not expect there to exist—
substantive ﬁnite and exceptionless moral principles of any variety.
In this article I raise a worry for the ﬁrst stage of this strategy.
Particularists assume a three-level framework according to which non-
normative facts at the ﬁrst level determine the facts about reasons at
the second level, which in turn determine other normative facts such
as the overall rightness and wrongness of actions at the third level, and
they want to claim that there is variability of an inscrutably complex
sort both in how the second level depends on the ﬁrst and in how the
third level depends on the second. However, I will argue that once one
builds this much variability into the framework, it begins to fall apart.
The very notion of a reason for action depends on there being a certain
level of constancy either in the connection between reasons and what
grounds them or in the connection between reasons and one’s overall
duties, and when particularists posit as much variability as they do, we
lose our grip on what they could mean when they call something a
‘reason for action’. In short: the conjunction of the particularists’ radical
claims about the behavior of reasons leaves them without a coherent
notion of a reason for action.
By considering this problem for particularism, we learn three val-
uable lessons. First, we learn that the particularists’ challenge to monist
and pluralist approaches to ethics has not, at least so far, been success-
fully made out. As there is signiﬁcant reason to doubt the plausibility
and even coherence of the particularists’ views about reasons, their bold
pronouncements should not give pause to those searching for the
proper grand uniﬁed theory of morality or the most appropriate dis-
connected heap of duties. Second, we learn something about the rea-
sons-based framework that is assumed not just by particularists but by
many other contemporary writers as well. In particular, we learn that
4. For example, this is how the various portions of the particularist program are
argued for by Dancy, Kihlbom, Lance, and Little in the works cited in n. 3.Berker Particular Reasons 113
this framework is not the presuppositionless starting point for ethical
theorizing that it is sometimes taken to be but rather—since particu-
larists cannot accept the framework while continuing to endorse every
claim they make—has certain substantive assumptions about the struc-
ture of morality and the nature of reasons built into it. And third, we
learn that particularism is perhaps best formulated without assuming
that framework. As there is a tension between the particularists’ claims
about the ultimate uncodiﬁability of the moral realm and the reasons-
based framework’s imposition of a general structure on that realm, it
is more in the spirit of particularism for its adherents to renounce that
framework altogether and attempt (if possible) to formulate particu-
larism without it.
5
II. THE GENERALIZED WEIGHING FRAMEWORK
Our main task will be to investigate the particularists’ views about reasons
for action. However, as particularists formulate those views within the
conﬁnes of a certain normative framework, it will help to outline that
framework ﬁrst before laying out the particularists’ own position on the
nature of reasons.
6
Suppose Andy is trying to decide which of two apartments to rent.
How might he go about making that decision? One natural suggestion
is that Andy should do something like the following. On a piece of
5. In this section I have characterized particularists as endorsing the view that there
does not exist—or, at least, that we do not have good reason to believe that there exists—
a ﬁnite set of true, ﬁnite, and exceptionless principles that can fully cover the moral
terrain. More recently, at least one particularist—namely, Jonathan Dancy—has backed
off from this claim and instead formulated his position on principles as follows: “The
possibility of moral thought and judgment does not depend on the provision of a suitable
supply of moral principles” (Ethics without Principles, 7). However, this formulation is mul-
tiply ambiguous, and it is difﬁcult to interpret Dancy’s new position in such a way that it
is not (a) obviously false, (b) equivalent to the formulation denying the existence of a
sufﬁcient number of true, ﬁnite, exceptionless principles, or (c) so weak a claim that it
can be accepted by nearly every monist and pluralist. For discussion, see Joseph Raz, “The
Trouble with Particularism (Dancy’s Version),” Mind 115 (2006): 99–120, 113–16; Sean
McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2006), 19–20; and Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever, review of Ethics without
Principles, by Jonathan Dancy, Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 124–28. Moreover, as my
chief focus in this article will be on the issue of whether particularists can establish their
claims about reasons, issues about how best to formulate their claims about principles will
not be of direct concern to us.
6. See John Broome, “Reasons,” in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy
of Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Schefﬂer, andMichaelSmith(Oxford:
Clarendon, 2004), 28–55, sec. 3, and John Horty, “Reasons as Defaults,”Philosophers’Imprint
7 (2007), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/007003, sec. 1, for similar accounts of the
general framework assumed by particularists (and others) in their discussions of reasons
for action.114 Ethics October 2007
paper he should make four columns and, in the ﬁrst column, write
down the positive elements, or ‘pros’, associated with taking the ﬁrst
apartment; in the second column, write down the negative elements,
or ‘cons’, associated with taking the ﬁrst apartment; in the third column,
write down the pros of taking the second apartment; and, in the fourth
column, write down the cons of taking the second apartment. Next, he
should decide the weight of each item in the four columns—that is,
decide how heavily each pro or con will affect his ultimate decision.
Finally, he should survey the relative weights of the various pros and
cons and come to a ﬁnal decision about which option has the most
favorable balance of considerations in its favor. Note that in this process
Andy need not be able to represent the weight of each pro or con with
anything as precise as a numerical value. Note, also, that the ﬁnal de-
termination of which option is the weightiest need not involve anything
as mechanical as adding up the weights of a given option’s pros and
subtracting the weights of its cons in order to determine a total weight
that can be compared with the total weight of the other option. But
despite these deviations from a strict analogy with a weighing of masses
on a scale, there still seems to be a useful sense in which we can say,
metaphorically at least, that Andy is weighing his options—or, as it is
commonly put, that he is weighing the reasons for and against each
alternative to see where the balance lies.
According to what I will call the “generalized weighing model of
practical deliberation,” all practical deliberation does—or at least
should—take the above form. Whenever an agent is in a given situation,
there are a variety of actions that the agent might choose to perform
in that situation.
7 Each of these actions in turn possesses a variety of
nonnormative properties, such as the property of causing pleasure in
someone or the property of being a telling of a lie. According to the
generalized weighing model, some of these nonnormative features give
rise to a reason in favor of performing the action possessing them, and
some of the features give rise to a reason against performing the action
possessing them.
8 Moreover, each of these reasons has a metaphorical
7. Following the particularists, I will be using the terms ‘situation’, ‘circumstance’,
and ‘context’ interchangeably. The notion they are after is just the commonsense notion
of a situation: one situation is the one I faced when I woke up this morning, another
situation is the one you face right now as you read this sentence, and so on.
8. The type of reasons under consideration are sometimes called ‘contributory rea-
sons’ or ‘pro tanto reasons’ to represent the fact that they need not be decisive reasons
for a given course of action. (A slightly older term for the same notion is ‘prima facie
reason’—a term that was misleading since the entities in question are not merely “at ﬁrst
glance” reasons but retain their normative force even if outweighed.) For brevity I will
usually omit the ‘contributory’ or ‘pro tanto’ qualiﬁer.
Some authors make a distinction between peremptory (or requiring) reasons, which countBerker Particular Reasons 115
weight or strength corresponding to how heavily it counts in favor of or
tells against the action it counts in favor of or tells against. Finally, the
generalized weighing model holds that each available action’s overall
moral status (such as its being right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden,
permissible or supererogatory) can be determined by balancing the
weights of the relevant reasons against each other in order to see where
the overall weight of reason lies.
9 When so construed, the generalized
weighing model is a widely held conception of practical deliberation
with an undeniable attraction to it; indeed, talk of reasons and their
weights almost makes this model seem inevitable.
10
As presented thus far, the generalized weighing model is an epis-
temological position concerning how one does (or should) determine
the overall moral status of the actions available to an agent. However,
it is also tempting to assume that the standard order of discovery during
deliberation mirrors the metaphysical order of explanation—or in other
words, it is tempting to make a slide from the epistemological claim that
the overall balance of reason reveals which actions are right and which
actions are wrong to the metaphysical claim that the overall balance of
reason is what makes the right actions right and the wrong actions wrong
(and similarly for other overall moral verdicts). According to what I will
toward the rightness of an action, and enticing reasons, which make an option attractive
without having a bearing on its rightness; see Joseph Raz, “Explaining Normativity:Reason
and the Will,” in his Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 90–117,
and Jonathan Dancy, “Enticing Reasons,” in Wallace et al., Reason and Value, 91–118. If
this distinction is tenable (I have my doubts), then every occurrence of ‘reason’ in the
body of this article should be replaced with ‘peremptory reason’.
Finally, a note about the ontology of reasons: throughout I talk about the ‘features’
of an action as ‘providing’ (or ‘giving rise to’) reasons for or against performing that
action and about the ‘fact’ that an action would have a given feature as ‘being’ a reason
for or against performing that action. By taking reasons to be facts, I am regimenting our
moral terminology in a way that not all theorists might endorse. However, nothing of
consequence hangs on the particular regimentation I have settled on, and one can easily
translate my talk of reasons as facts into a terminology adverting to one’s ontological
category of choice.
9. My discussion here concentrates on the overall moral status of actions, but the
generalized weighing model is often applied more generally to the overall normative status
of an action, such as its being what one ought (all things considered) to do or its being
what it is most in one’s interests to do. Particularists usually intend their claims to extend
to these normative categories as well.
10. The two contemporary works most responsible, I believe, for making the gen-
eralized weighing model of deliberation as widely accepted as it currently is are Kurt Baier,
The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1958), and Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1970), both of which quite explicitly endorse the model: see chap. 3 of the former
and chap. 7 of the latter. A more recent endorsement of essentially the same model can
be found in T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), 65–66; and Derek Parﬁt, Climbing the Mountain (forthcoming).116 Ethics October 2007
call the “generalized weighing model of morality,” this latter metaphysi-
cal claim is indeed the case: the nonnormative features of the actions
available to an agent in a given circumstance give rise to genuine meta-
physical normative entities, called ‘reasons for action’, and the interplay
of these reasons is what makes it such that the available actions have
the overall moral status that they do.
To simplify our discussion, let us focus in this article on two overall
moral statuses that an action might have, namely, that of being right
and that of being wrong. Also, drawing on a partial analogy with chem-
istry that has become standard in the particularist literature, let us say
that a reason for action has a positive or negative valence depending
on whether it is a reason for or against action, respectively. Then on
the generalized weighing model of morality, we can think of the meta-
physical moral picture as having three layers to it:
1. The underlying level: the facts about the nonnormative properties
of the actions available to a given agent in a given circumstance.
11
2. The contributory level: the facts about the valences and weights of
the reasons for and against performing each available action, which
obtain in virtue of the facts at the underlying level.
3. The overall level: the facts about the rightness and wrongness of the
available actions, which obtain in virtue of the facts at the con-
tributory level.
12
So once this model is in place, we can say that a nonnormative feature
of an action that provides a reason for acting in that way is a “right-
making feature” since it contributes toward the overall balance of reason
in favor of that action being such as to make the action right. Similarly,
a feature that provides a reason against an action can be said to be a
“wrong-making feature.” What determines the rightness and wrongness
of actions on this conception is the overall balance of reason in favor
of each, and what determines the reasons for and against each action
are its nonnormative properties. To have a name for it, let us call the
11. In this article I assume that the underlying level consists of facts about the non-
normative properties of the actions available to an agent. However, McNaughton and Rawling
(in their “Unprincipled Ethics”) defend a theory according to which the facts at the
underlying level that give rise to reasons for and against action at the contributory level
are facts about the thick moral properties of actions. This complicates the picture but does
not change anything important in the article’s dialectic since presumably the thick moral
properties themselves obtain in virtue of the nonnormative properties of the available
actions.
12. Note that this talk of normative facts obtaining is all unabashedly realistsounding;
indeed, I take it to be a basic assumption of the debate about particularism that moral
realism holds. (Sometimes particularists insist that their talk of normative facts and prop-
erties can be construed minimalistically if one has antirealist persuasions, but whether this
is really so is open to debate.)Berker Particular Reasons 117
conjunction of the deliberative and metaphysical weighing models the
“generalized weighing framework.”
Two slightly more concrete examples will help illustrate how the
generalized weighing framework works. Although classical utilitarians
rarely talk of reasons for or against action, we can easily imagine one
way of ﬁtting hedonistic act utilitarianism (henceforth: utilitarianism)
into the conﬁnes of the generalized weighing framework. According to
such a version of utilitarianism, there are two nonnormative properties
at the underlying level that give rise to reasons for and against action
at the contributory level: the property of bringing about pleasure in
someone, which always gives rise to a reason for action, and the property
of bringing about pain in someone, which always gives rise to a reason
against action. The ‘always’ here is important: on the utilitarian story,
not only is the property of bringing about pleasure in someone right
making, but it is necessarily right making (in every possible situation it
provides a reason for action), and not only is the property of bringing
about pain in someone wrong making, but it is necessarily wrong making
(in every possible situation it provides a reason against action). More-
over, the utilitarian has a correspondingly simple story about what ﬁxes
the weight of a given reason: the weight of every reason for action is
directly proportional to how much pleasure the action would bring
about in the relevant person, and the weight of every reason against
action is directly proportional to how much pain the action would bring
about in the relevant person; indeed, we can even represent these
weights with numbers if we wish. Finally, our utilitarian holds that the
overall level is determined by the contributory level in the following
manner: for each action, add up the numbers representing the weights
of the reasons in favor of acting in that way and subtract the numbers
representing the weights of the reasons against; the actions with the
highest such total are right, and all other available actions are wrong.
A second ethical theory easily shoehorned into the generalized
weighing framework is W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duties.
13 Adapted
so as to involve explicit talk of reasons for action, Rossianism maintains
that there are seven sets of nonnormative features that in every possible
circumstance give rise to reasons for or against the actions possessing
them. For instance, on this account it follows from Ross’s prima facie
duty of ﬁdelity that the property of being a breaking of a promise always
provides a reason against action, from his prima facie duty of self-im-
provement that the property of contributing to the improvement of
13. At least since the publication of J. O. Urmson, “A Defense of Intuitionism,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1975): 111–19, if not earlier, it has been common
to reinterpret Ross’s theory of prima facie duties as a theory of (contributory or pro tanto)
reasons for action.118 Ethics October 2007
one’s intelligence always provides a reason for action, and so on, for all
seven of Ross’s prima facie duties.
14 Thus, in regard to what determines
the valence of a given reason, the Rossian story is similar to the utilitarian
story, in that each posits a certain range of nonnormative features that
are necessarily right or wrong making, although the Rossian list of such
features is lengthier and of a more varied nature. Moreover, Ross insists
that “the ground of the actual rightness of [an] act is that, of all acts
possible for the agent in the circumstances, it is that whose prima facie
rightness in the respects in which it is prima facie right most outweighs
its prima facie wrongness in any respects in which it is prima facie wrong,”
which strongly suggests that he too would determine how the facts at
the overall level depend on the facts at the contributory level through
the simple additive procedure endorsed by the utilitarian.
15
Where the Rossian account diverges in spirit from the utilitarian
one is in how the weight of a given reason is determined. According to
Ross, which of the various, possibly competing prima facie duties is most
binding in a particular situation depends upon “the circumstances of
the case” since “for the estimation of the comparative stringency of these
prima facie obligations no general rules can . . . be laid down.”
16 Thus,
on one plausible interpretation of Ross, he would hold that the relative
weights of the reasons stemming from his prima facie duties vary from
context to context: a nonnormative feature of an action that gives rise
to a reason of one weight in one situation might give rise to a reason
of a different weight in a different situation, depending on the details
of the two cases. This is the sense in which Ross’s theory provides an
ineliminable role for judgment—as there are no general, context-in-
dependent rules for how the nonnormative features of an action de-
termine the weights of the reasons for and against it, discerning the
weight of an individual reason in a given situation requires judging how
demanding that reason is in the current circumstance.
17
III. PARTICULARISM ABOUT REASONS FOR ACTION
Particularists applaud Ross’s inclusion of an ineliminable role for judg-
ment in his theory but feel he did not go far enough. As mentioned
before, for particularists it’s judgment all the way down: not only judg-
14. See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 1930), 21, for the
original list of Ross’s seven prima facie duties.
15. Ibid., 46.
16. Ibid., 19, 41.
17. I have mentioned two theories that can be easily ﬁt into the generalized weighing
framework, but it is worth noting that not all moral theories can be so easily ﬁt into the
framework. In particular, it is far from clear how to formulate Kantian ethical theories
within the generalized weighing framework without doing major damage to both the
content and intent of those theories.Berker Particular Reasons 119
ment as to the weight of a given reason but also judgment as to the
valence of a reason and judgment as to how the valences and weights
of the relevant reasons play off each other to determine the overall
moral status of the available actions. Jonathan Dancy, perhaps the most
prominent particularist, summarizes the particularists’ views about rea-
sons as follows:
I see ethical particularism as merely one expression of an overall
holism in the theory of normative reason. . . . Such an overall
holism can be expressed as follows:
1. What is a reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity
[i.e., valence] in another.
2. The way in which the reasons here present combine with each
other is not necessarily determinable in any simply additive way.
18
Thus, particularism about reasons for action is a two-fold thesis: it con-
cerns both the way in which reasons for action arise out of a situation’s
nonnormative features and the way in which the reasons for action that
are present in a given situation combine to yield the overall moral status
of the available actions. Let us consider each of these claims in turn.
According to what has come to be known as “holism about reasons
for action,”
19 the very valence of the reason (if any) provided by a given
nonnormative feature of an action can alter as we change contexts.
Here is one sort of example offered by particularists in support of this
thesis: in most situations the fact that an action would bring the agent
pleasure is a reason in favor of performing that action, but when Tyler
tortures a cat for fun, the fact that doing so brings him pleasure is
(allegedly) a reason against his acting in that way. Another example: in
most situations the fact that I borrowed a book from you is a reason in
favor of my returning it to you, but if you stole the book, then the fact
that I borrowed the book from you is (allegedly) no reason at all for me
to return it. The particularists’ bold claim is that all reasons function
in this way: for every fact that is a reason for action in one possible
context, there is another possible context in which that same fact is
either a reason against action or no reason at all, and an analogous
claim is taken to hold for reasons against action. So whereas our utili-
tarian and Rossian theories identify certain necessarily right- and wrong-
making features, particularists insist that all right-making features are
18. Dancy, “Particularist’s Progress,” 132.
19. Some might ﬁnd the use of the label ‘holism’ here a bit odd since the position
in question is quite different from the other sorts of holisms that one ﬁnds in philosophy.
However, by now the name “holism about reasons for action” (originally coined by Dancy)
is too ﬁrmly entrenched in the philosophical lexicon to resist.120 Ethics October 2007
only contingently right making, and all wrong-making features only con-
tingently wrong making. In sum, particularists hold
holism about reasons for action: for every nonnormative feature of an
action that gives rise to a reason for/against action in one possible
context, there is another possible context in which that same feature
either gives rise to a reason of opposite valence or else provides no
reason one way or the other.
20
Or as Margaret Little, another prominent particularist, puts it: “A con-
sideration that in one context counts for an action, can in another count
against it or be irrelevant.”
21
Holism about reasons for action concerns how the facts at the
contributory level depend on the facts at the underlying level. The
second half of particularism about reasons for action concerns how the
facts at the overall level depend on the facts at the contributory level.
Let us call the function that takes as input the valence and weight of
all the reasons present in a given possible situation and gives as output
the rightness or wrongness of each action available in that situation the
“combinatorial function”; given the generalized weighing model’s as-
20. This formulation of holism about reasons for action may need to be qualiﬁed in
two ways. First, in order to avoid certain cheap counterexamples in which one builds a
complete description of a given context into the property being considered (e.g., the
property of being a telling of a lie in such and such a situation, where the “such and
such” provides an exhaustive description of some particular situation), particularists may
need to restrict the holist thesis so that it pertains only to nonnormative features that can
be speciﬁed “in ﬁnite or helpful propositional form.” (The latter phrase is Little’s; see
“Moral Generalities Revisited,” 280.) Second, even when the formulation has been qual-
iﬁed in this way, the word ‘every’ may need to be replaced with ‘nearly every’: recently
Dancy has conceded that he might be forced to admit the existence of a “privileged few”
reasons whose valence is not sensitive to context, “including probably the intentional
inﬂicting of undeserved pain” (Dancy, “Particularist’s Progress,” 131; see also his Ethics
without Principles, 77–78). As nothing I say about holism turns on whether it is qualiﬁed
in these two ways, I ignore these complications in what follows. (An anonymous referee
suggested to me a third possible qualiﬁcation that might be needed to properly formulate
holism: perhaps, following Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 77, and Pekka Va ¨yrynen, “Moral
Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation,” Ethics 116 [2006]: 707–41, 712, holism about reasons
for action is best formulated not as the thesis that all reasons for action can vary in valence
but rather as the thesis that all reasons for action are variable qua reasons, even if some
reasons for action happen to be invariant due to their particular content. However, even
if we ignore the obscurities involved in this distinction between a reason’s varying in
valence due to its particular content and its varying in valence due to its nature as a reason,
I ﬁnd this formulation of holism to be unsatisfactory. In particular, it would allow that
someone who endorses the utilitarian theory of reasons for action glossed in Sec. II could
count as a holist about reasons for action, as long as that person thinks that, qua reasons,
reasons for action are variable, though it just happens to turn out that, due to their
content, all reasons for action are invariant.)
21. Little, “On Knowing the ‘Why,’” 34.Berker Particular Reasons 121
sumption that the facts at the contributory level determine the facts at
the overall level, such a function must exist.
22 Let us say that the
23 com-
binatorial function is additive if it can be calculated by adding up the
weights of the reasons in favor of each action and subtracting the weights
of the reasons against and then assigning an overall moral status (right
or wrong or neither) to a given action on the basis of comparing the
total weight of reason in favor of that action to the total weight in favor
of the other available actions. Now particularists are quite explicit in
denying that the combinatorial function is additive.
24 Moreover, the
particularists’ general rhetoric makes it clear that they intend to deny
that the combinatorial function can be written down in any ﬁnite for-
mula, additive or otherwise.
25 In other words, particularists hold
22. Shelly Kagan uses the expression “governing function” for much the same notion
in “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics 99 (1988): 5–31, 14, and then goes on to argue that this
function is not additive. Nagel (in Possibility of Altruism) prefers the term ‘combinatorial
principle’, but there is a worry that this choice of terminology begs the question against
the particularist by assuming that the combinatorial function can be represented as a
ﬁnitely expressible principle.
23. Note my talk of ‘the’ combinatorial function, as opposed to ‘a’ combinatorial
function: since I am using the term ‘function’ in the mathematical sense, there is only
one combinatorial function, which holds for all contexts. Suppose I ask you to think of
two natural numbers and either add the numbers together if they’re both even or multiply
them if at least one is odd. Have I just deﬁned one function or two functions that change
depending on which numbers you choose? In the mathematical sense, there is only one
function here—only one mapping from the set of pairs of numbers you might choose to
the set of numbers you might end up with after you have done what I tell you to do. One
way of representing this function is as follows:
x  y if x and y are even,
f(x,y) p {x # y otherwise.
Similarly, I intend there to be only one combinatorial function. Even if, intuitively,reasons
combine one way in some contexts and combine a different way in other contexts, this
can always be represented by a single function from the morally relevant factors in any
given possible context to the rightness and wrongness of the actions available in that
context.
24. In addition to the passage already quoted from Dancy (“The way in which the
reasons here present combine with each other is not necessarily determinable in any
simply additive way”; “Particularist’s Progress,” 132), Dancy denies that “once one has
assessed the separate weight of each element, evaluative judgment consists of adding up
the pros and cons to see which side is weightier” (Ethics without Principles, 190), and Little
rejects a view according to which each moral reason “goes in the hopper to be weighed
against whatever other independent factors happen to be present” (“Moral Generalities
Revisited,” 280). See also Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 15, 105–6, 127, 143.
25. Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” 279 n. 3: “I’m reserving the ‘particularist’
label for those who deny codiﬁcation at both levels [i.e., at both the contributory and the
overall level],” and “Wittgensteinian Lessons on Moral Particularism,” 166–67: “The par-
ticularist begins by rejecting attempts to codify relations between nonmoral and moral
properties. The resultant picture also leads to a rejection of efforts to systematize relations122 Ethics October 2007
noncombinatorialism about reasons for action: the combinatorial func-
tion for rightness and wrongness is not ﬁnitely expressible (and so,
in particular, not additive).
Thus, for particularists, reasons for action are inextricably context de-
pendent twice over: which nonnormative features give rise to reasons
for or against action varies from context to context, and how the various
reasons that are present combine to yield the overall rightness and
wrongness of actions also varies from context to context.
26 Together, the
twin theses of holism and noncombinatorialism about reasons for action
make up the view that I am calling “particularism about reasons for
action.”
IV. A NEWTONIAN ANALOGY
Eventually I am going to argue that once they embrace both halves of
particularism about reasons for action, particularists no longer have
available to them a coherent notion of a reason for action. First, though,
let us consider an analogy to help bring out the point.
We can think of the model of reasons that the particularists oppose
as being akin to the following simpliﬁed version of Newtonian classical
mechanics. Suppose we have a number of massive point particles in
empty space that are interacting with each other purely through the
classical law of gravitation. Then each particle exerts a force on every
other particle that is determined solely by the masses of the two particles
and their relative positions.
27 So in any situation in which a particle of
mass m1 is at coordinates (x1, y1, z1) and a second particle of mass m2 is
at coordinates (x2, y2, z2), the individual force exerted on the ﬁrst particle
by the second is the same in both magnitude and direction, regardless
of the mass and position of any other particles that may or may not be
present in that situation. This is analogous to the claim, denied by holism
among moral properties.” Dancy’s discussion in Ethics without Principles of Kagan’s “The
Additive Fallacy” makes it clear that he too intendsto deny thatthereisaﬁnitelyexpressible
combinatorial function: “For the particularist, it is going to be variability all the way down”
(Ethics without Principles, 10). See also McNaughton and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,”
260 n. 12, where they claim that “the relation between an agent’s reasons and her obli-
gations is, we think, complex” and insist that there is “no weighing algorithm” for reasons.
26. It is important to notice that the type of context dependence at issue here is very
different from the sort of context dependence at issue in debates about epistemic con-
textualism. Unlike contextualists in epistemology, particularists are not making a semantic
claim about how a given word such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason’ picks out a differentrelation
in different contexts; rather, the context in question is the context of the subject, not the
context of utterance.
27. More precisely, the force acting on some particle 1 due to another particle 2
always points in the direction of particle 2 and always has a magnitude of ,
2 F p Gm m /r 12
where m1 is the mass of particle 1, m2 is the mass of particle 2, r is the distance between
the two particles, and G is the universal gravitational constant.Berker Particular Reasons 123
about reasons for action, that there are certain features of actions that
always give rise to an individual reason for or against performing the
action bearing that feature, regardless of what other features may or
may not be present. Moreover, in our Newtonian model, the total force
acting on a given particle is determined by a vector sum of the individual
forces acting on that particle due to every other particle in the situation.
This is analogous to the claim, denied by noncombinatorialism about
reasons for action, that we can determine the total reason in favor of
each action by adding up the weights of the individual reasons for and
against performing that action.
We can easily imagine what a particularistic version of this New-
tonian model would look like. As before, we have various massive point
particles moving around in an empty three-dimensional space. However,
for any given conﬁguration of particles, the individual force acting on
one particle due to another is not given by any general formula that
holds regardless of the positions and masses of the other particles. Sup-
pose that in one conﬁguration there is a certain individual force acting
on a particle of mass m1 at coordinates (x1, y1, z1) due to a second particle
of mass m2 at coordinates (x2, y2, z2). Then there is no assurance that
in any other conﬁguration in which those two particles have the same
mass and are at the same position, the individual force acting on the
ﬁrst particle due to the second is the same: depending on the positions
and masses of the various other particles in the conﬁguration, the ﬁrst
might have no force exerted on it by the second, or it might even have
a force in the opposite direction exerted on it. This is the holist element
in the model. But we can also build in a noncombinatorialist element,
so that there is no ﬁnitely expressible formula, additive or otherwise,
for determining how the individual forces being exerted on a given
particle combine to yield the total force that the particle is subject to.
In some conﬁgurations the total force acting on a particle might be a
vector sum of the individual forces acting on it, but in other conﬁgu-
rations the total force might be a cross product of the individual forces
acting on the particle, or it might be a cross product added to another
cross product, or it might be something even more complicated, de-
pending on the intricacies of the case at hand.
However, it should be clear that, once we include both the holist
and the noncombinatorialist ingredients in our Newtonian model, we
begin to lose sight of what this notion of an individual force even
amounts to. What does it mean to say that, in this model, one particle
exerts an individual force in a given direction on a second particle? It
doesn’t mean that if no other forces were acting on the second particle,
then it would accelerate in the direction of the individual force because
(due to the holist element in the model) the nature of the individual
force acting on the second particle is dependent upon the other forces124 Ethics October 2007
acting on it as well. It doesn’t mean that if the individual force were
not present, then the second particle would tend to accelerate in the
direction opposite to the individual force because (also due to the holist
element in the model) the other individual forces acting on the second
particle could potentially change if the individual force due to the ﬁrst
were removed. And it doesn’t mean that there is a contribution in the
individual force’s direction to the total force acting on the second par-
ticle (a contribution that “counts in favor” of the total force being in
that direction, as we might put it) because (due to the noncombina-
torialist element in the model) the total force acting on a particle is
not always a vector sum of the individual forces acting on it. So what,
then, does this notion of an individual force being exerted on a particle
amount to?
Thus, once we build the holist and noncombinatorialist elements
into our Newtonian model, we lose our grip on what it means for one
particle to exert an individual force on another. Similarly, I maintain,
once particularists build both their holist and noncombinatorialist el-
ements into the generalized weighing framework, we lose our grip on
what they mean by a reason for or against action.
28
V. DO PARTICULARISTS HAVE A COHERENT NOTION OF A
REASON FOR ACTION?
Recall the three-level generalized weighing framework within which par-
ticularists formulate their claims about how reasons work: according to
that framework, certain nonnormative features of the actions available
to an agent provide reasons of various valences and weights for and
against performing those actions (the dependence of the contributory
level on the underlying level), and the overall moral status of the
available actions is determined in virtue of the valences and weights
of those reasons (the dependence of the overall level on the contrib-
utory level). Thus, within this framework, the contribution of an in-
dividual reason for action to the entire system is exhausted by two
roles it plays: (i) some nonnormative feature of an action gives rise
to that reason, and (ii) that reason counts one way or the other toward
the rightness or wrongness (as well as other overall moral verdicts) of
the action bearing that feature. However, particularists insist that each
28. Some particularists might try to deny that the particularistic Newtonian model
just described is really analogous to a particularistic theory of reasons for action. However,
all parties should agree that a nonparticularistic theory of reasons for action is analogous
to the nonparticularistic Newtonian model. Moreover, I put forward that the ways in which
a particularistic theory of reasons for action deviates from a nonparticularistic one are
exactly analogous to the ways in which the particularistic Newtonian model deviates from
a nonparticularistic one. It follows that particularists must concede that their theory of
reasons is analogous to the particularistic Newtonian model.Berker Particular Reasons 125
of these deﬁning roles is inscrutably context dependent. As particularists
see it, reasons for action are context dependent both “from below” and
“from above”: context dependent “from below” since whether a given
nonnormative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action varies
from context to context (holism about reasons for action), and context
dependent “from above” since how the reasons present in a given cir-
cumstance combine to determine the overall moral status of the actions
available in that circumstance varies from context to context (noncom-
binatorialism about reasons for action). But then particularistic reasons
for action would appear to be free-ﬂoating cogs in the normative ma-
chinery, and it becomes difﬁcult to understand what particularists even
mean when they call something a ‘reason for action’ or a ‘reason against
action’.
According to one common conception, a reason for action is a
consideration that would decisively count in favor of a given action were
no other reasons present. So on this view, which we might call the
“isolation conception of a reason for action,” the fact that action X
would have feature F in circumstance C qualiﬁes as a reason for per-
forming X in C if and only if, in any possible situation in which F is the
only morally relevant feature of the actions available to the agent, the
actions possessing F are the right thing to do: when no other moral
considerations are present, a reason for action “carries the day.” Simi-
larly, on this conception, the fact that action Y would have feature G in
circumstance D qualiﬁes as a reason against performing Y in D if and
only if, in any possible situation in which feature G is the only morally
relevant feature of the actions available to the agent, the actions pos-
sessing G are the wrong thing to do. However, it just falls out of this
conception of what it is to be a reason for or against action that the
holist half of particularism about reasons for action is false. Suppose
the fact that a given action would be a telling of a lie is a reason against
performing that action in some circumstance C. Then given the isolation
conception, it follows that in any situation in which the property of
being a telling of a lie is the only morally relevant feature of the actions
available in that situation, those actions that involve telling a lie are
wrong. But this in turn implies that the fact that an action would be a
telling of a lie is a reason against performing that action in every cir-
cumstance, not just C, for in every circumstance it is now the case that,
were the property of being a telling of a lie the only morally relevant
feature of the actions available to the agent, the actions possessing that
property would be wrong. Thus, the isolation conception entails, contra
the claims of holism, that whenever some feature provides a reason
against action in one possible context, that feature must provide a reason
against action in every possible context. For this reason, particularists126 Ethics October 2007
who endorse holism cannot accept the isolation conception of a reason
for action.
According to a second possible conception, which we might call
the “removal conception of a reason for action,” a reason for action is
a consideration whose removal would make the action in question less
right, and a reason against action is a consideration whose removal
would make the action less wrong. More precisely, on this conception
the fact that action X would have feature F in circumstance C is a reason
for (or against) action X if and only if, for any sufﬁciently similar cir-
cumstance C
  in which X, if performed, would have all the same morally
relevant features except F, X is less right (or less wrong) in C
  than in
C. In a sense, then, this proposal is the converse of the previous one:
in order to determine whether a given feature of an action gives rise
to a reason for or against performing that action, we remove only the
feature in question and see how the rightness or wrongness of the action
varies, rather than remove every other morally relevant feature. Now
there are difﬁculties making precise how all of this should go. For ex-
ample, the proposal implicitly assumes that rightness and wrongness
come in degrees (which one might contest), and something needs to
be said about how in general one is to strip away the feature being
evaluated while holding all other morally relevant features constant. (It
is clear enough what one is to do when determining whether the prop-
erty of, say, producing pleasure gives rise to a reason in favor of action—
simply make the action less pleasurable and see whether the rightness
of the action in turn diminishes—but in most other cases it is far less
clear how to “cleanly excise” the property being assessed.) However, we
can sidestep these issues, because regardless of how they are resolved,
the particularists’ holism prohibits them from being able to make use
of the removal conception.
The whole point of holism about reasons for action is that the
valence of the reason provided by a given feature of an action is de-
termined by other features of the case at hand, not by features of the
action (such as its comparative rightness or wrongness) in certain coun-
terfactual situations. Holism holds that in a counterfactual situation in
which we remove only the feature being scrutinized, this change might
lead to any number of other changes in the valences and strengths of
the reasons provided by other features of the available actions; thus,
given holism, the method invoked by the removal conception will be
unable to isolate the individual contribution made by the speciﬁc feature
being considered. The following example is used by Dancy to illustrate
this very point:
Consider a case in which I am thinking of doing something for a
friend. My action, were I to do it, would be good, and partly goodBerker Particular Reasons 127
because it is an expression of our friendship. But now, if I were to
be doing the action and not doing it for a friend, I would presum-
ably be doing it for someone who is not a friend, and it might be
that doing it for someone who is not a friend is even better than
doing it for a friend. . . . Our friendship seems to be a reason to
do the action even though if we were not friends I would have even
more reason to do it.
29
The example is intended to work as follows: in one situation the fact
that an action would be one done for a friend might be a reason to
perform that action, even though one has more overall reason to per-
form the action (and hence, the action is more right) in some sufﬁciently
similar situation whose only relevant difference is that the person in
question is not one’s friend. Now Dancy’s interpretation of this partic-
ular pair of cases is controversial, but even if one rejects that interpre-
tation the main point remains: holists about reasons for action will want
to allow for the possibility that pairs of cases might exist that have the
general structure Dancy alleges these two cases to have, but the removal
conception rules out the possibility of such cases from the outset, so
holists about reasons for action cannot avail themselves of this concep-
tion of a reason for action.
30
According to a third possible conception, a reason for action is a
consideration that counts in favor of a certain course of action being
the right thing to do, and a reason against action, a consideration that
counts against. So on this story, which we might call the “right-making
conception of a reason for action,” a reason for performing action X
contributes positively toward X being right in the given circumstance,
and a reason against performing action X contributes negatively toward
X being right in the given circumstance (i.e., contributes positively toward
X being wrong in that circumstance). However, particularists cannot hold
this conception of a reason for action, either. The problem is that talk
of a reason being a consideration counting in favor of or against a certain
action being the right thing to do makes the most sense when there is
an additive combinatorial function; the more we deviate from an additive
combinatorial function, the more obscure such talk becomes.
In order to show why this is so, it will help if we get a little more
formal. Suppose there are only two nonnormative features of actions
that give rise to reasons for or against action: F1 and F2. If X is an action
29. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 20.
30. Little makes the same point: “If we accept the doctrine of holism, the implication
of changing one variable is inﬂuenced, in ways that defy codiﬁcation, by differences in
the other variables’ values. We cannot isolate the implication of switching from truth-
telling to lying by holding other variables constant, for it matters what the substantive
content of those variables was in the ﬁrst place” (“Moral Generalities Revisited,” 290). See
also Jonathan Dancy, “Defending Particularism,” Metaphilosophy 30 (1999): 25–31, 31.128 Ethics October 2007
available to an agent in circumstance C, let be a real number r (X,C) 1
representing the valence and weight of the reason, if any, provided by
X’s possessing feature F1 in the following manner:
If X would possess F1 if performed in C, and that fact is a reason for
performing X in that context, then , and its absolute r (X,C) 1 0 1
value represents the weight of the reason so provided.
If X would possess F1 if performed in C, and that fact is a reason
against performing X in that context, then , and its r (X,C) ! 0 1
absolute value represents the weight of the reason so provided.
Otherwise, . r (X,C) p 0 1
Moreover, let represent in a similar way the valence and weight r (X,C) 2
of the reason, if any, provided by X’s possessing feature F2 if performed
in C. Then if there is an additive combinatorial function, we can represent
the total reason in favor of action X in circumstance C as follows:
t(X,C) p r (X,C)  r (X,C). 12
Finally, let the actions available to the agent in circumstance C that
maximize this function be the right ones to do in that circumstance,
and let all other available actions be the wrong ones to do.
31
When we determine the rightness or wrongness of actions from the
valences and weights of the relevant reasons in this way, it is readily
transparent why reasons for a given action are considerations that count
in favor of that action being right and reasons against are considerations
that count in favor of it being wrong. Since is always positive r(X,C) i
when a reason for action is provided by X’s possessing Fi, reasons in
favor of performing X always add to the total reason in favor of X in
C. And since is always negative when a reason against action is r(X,C) i
provided by X’s possessing Fi, reasons against performing X always sub-
tract from the total reason in favor of X in C. So when the combinatorial
function is additive, it is perfectly natural to talk about a reason in favor
of some action being an individual positive contribution toward its right-
ness and a reason against that action being an individual positive con-
tribution toward its wrongness.
For some ways of deviating from a strictly additive combinatorial
function, the naturalness of this way of talking is preserved. For example,
suppose there are still only two nonnormative features, F1 and F2, that
31. Thus, if I is an index set that ranges over the indices for all the actions Xi available
to the agent in circumstance C, the combinatorial function can be represented in its full
glory as follows:
right if (Gj  I)[t(X,C) ≥ t(X,C)], ij f(X,C) p i {wrong otherwise.Berker Particular Reasons 129
ever give rise to reasons for or against action, but the total reason in
favor of action X in context C is instead determined as follows:
  3 t (X,C) p [r (X,C)]  r (X,C). 12
As before, the right actions are those that maximize the total reason func-
tion, and the wrong actions those that do not. And since is
3 [r (X,C)] 1
always positive when is positive and always negative when r (X,C) 1
is negative, it still makes sense to talk about the reasons of r (X,C) 1
positive valence provided by feature F1 counting in favor of the rightness
of the action possessing that feature and the reasons of negative valence
provided by feature F1 counting against the action’s rightness. However,
suppose instead that the total reason function is determined like so:
   2 t (X,C) p [r (X,C)]  r (X,C). 12
Now we have trouble. If the fact that X would have feature F1 is a
reason against performing X in C, then although is negative, r (X,C) 1
is positive, so that fact adds to the total reason in favor of X
2 [r (X,C)] 1
and hence counts in favor of, not against, X being right in the given
circumstance. In other words, given this way of combining reasons to
determine overall rightness and wrongness, whenever feature F1 pro-
vides a reason against action in a given context, that feature is actually
right making in that context. For this reason we are no longer operating
with the right-making conception of a reason for action. And a similar
point applies if instead the total reason function is a multiplicative func-
tion like the following:
    t (X,C) p r (X,C)r (X,C). 12
Suppose X would have feature F1 if performed in C, and that fact is a
reason for performing X in C. Then is positive, but whether r (X,C) 1
this positively or negatively affects the total reason in favor of X in C
now depends on the sign of and hence depends on the valence r (X,C) 2
of the reason (if any) provided by the other feature, F2. In this case, talk
of a reason for action as being a consideration that always counts in
favor of the rightness of that action has become strained at best.
32
I take these examples to show that one cannot hold the right-making
conception of a reason for action while allowing that the combinatorial
function determining rightness and wrongness can have any old form
whatsoever. In order to make sense of the idea that reasons for action
always contribute toward an action’s rightness and reasons against always
32. Kagan makes much the same point when he notes that without what he calls the
“additive assumption” (in effect, the assumption that there is an additive combinatorial
function), any talk of “contributions” made by individual morally relevant factors seems
out of place (“Additive Fallacy,” 17).130 Ethics October 2007
contribute toward its wrongness, we need the combinatorial function to
be such that (i) individual reasons always make discernible individual
contributions to the overall rightness or wrongness of a given action and
(ii) the individual contribution made by a reason of positive valence always
positively affects the total reason in favor of the action in question, and
the individual contribution made by a reason of negative valence always
negatively affects the total reason in favor of the action. Let us call the
combinatorial function “quasi-additive” if, like the combinatorial function
constructed from the total reason function above, it satisﬁes these
  t (X,C)
two criteria.
33 It is important to notice that the vast majority of possible
combinatorial functions are neither additive nor quasi-additive.
34 How-
ever, those who endorse the right-making conception must hold, on pains
of having an incoherent notion of a reason for action, that the combi-
natorial function is, if not additive, then at least quasi-additive. It follows
from the particularists’ noncombinatorialism that the combinatorial func-
tion is not additive. Moreover, it is not clear what grounds particularists
have to insist that, although we don’t know enough about the combi-
natorial function to be able to write it down in ﬁnite form, we do know
enough about it to know that it is quasi-additive. This puts particularists
who endorse both noncombinatorialism and the right-making conception
in a precarious position: the coherence of their very notion of a reason
foractiondependsontherebeingaquasi-additivecombinatorialfunction,
but it is difﬁcult to see what means they have of establishing that there
33. Note that on this way of characterizing what makes a combinatorial function
quasi-additive, all additive combinatorial functions also count as quasi-additive. The def-
inition of quasi-additivity provided here is admittedly vague, but it will do for present
purposes. Indeed, I suspect it is not possible to be any more precise in characterizing
quasi-additivity without making various assumptions about the combinatorial functionthat
would not be accepted by all moral theorists. For example, if we can represent the valence
and weight of every distinct reason by a variable ri in the way described in the text and
if the combinatorial function can be calculated in terms of a total reason function,
, that is a function of the reason variables and if that total reason function t(r ,r , ... r ) 12 n
is differentiable at every point with respect to each of those variables, then I put forward
that the combinatorial function is quasi-additive if and only if the following obtains for
each i such that : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
t
≥ 0 for all values of r ,r , ... r . 12 n ri
However, this precise a formulation of quasi-additivity comes at the cost of some fairly
substantial—and controversial—assumptions about the nature of the combinatorial func-
tion. (It is interesting to note that, given this formulation of what it takes for the com-
binatorial function to be quasi-additive, the requirement that the combinatorial function
be quasi-additive is equivalent to the requirement that reasons for actionsatisfytheremoval
conception.)
34. This point is only bolstered if we do not assume, as I did in the examples of the
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is one without conceding that the combinatorial function might, after
all, be ﬁnitely expressible. Conclusion: because of their commitment to
noncombinatorialism, particularists are not entitled to hold the right-
making conception of a reason of action.
35
Could particularists resist this line of argument by insisting that it
is an analytic truth that the combinatorial function is quasi-additive? I
doubt it. Even if we ignore Quinean concerns about analyticity, the
purported analytic truth is far more recherche ´ than the sorts of things
that are usually held to be true merely in virtue of the meaning of the
terms involved.
36 Moreover, if we allow that we can know by studying
35. Objection: It is possible to construct a combinatorial function that is quasi-additive
but not ﬁnitely expressible by splicing together several quasi-additive combinatorial func-
tions in an uncodiﬁable manner. For example, particularists could insist that in some
contexts the total reason function is given by , that in other contexts the total t(X,C)
reason function is given by , and that there is no cashing out in ﬁnite terms when
  t (X,C)
one of these two total reason functions applies. As each of these total reason functions
satisﬁes the conditions for quasi-additivity, it follows that the resulting combinatorial func-
tion will be quasi-additive but not ﬁnitely expressible.
Reply: It is amistake to assumethatjustbecausethecombinatorialfunctionconstructed
from total reason function is quasi-additive and the combinatorial function con- t (X,C) 1
structed from total reason function is quasi-additive, the combinatorial function t (X,C) 2
constructed from the following total reason function must be quasi-additive:
t (X,C) if such and such conditions obtain, 1 t (X,C) p 3 {t (X,C) otherwise. 2
For example, as explained in the body of the article, we can construct an additive (and
hence quasi-additive) combinatorial function from the following total reason function:
t(X,C) p r (X,C) r (X,C). 12
Moreover, in a similar way we can construct an additive (hence quasi-additive) combi-
natorial function from the following total reason function:
     t (X,C) p r (X,C) r (X,C) 500. 12
However, a combinatorial function constructed in the same way from the following total
reason function is not quasi-additive:
r (X,C) r (X,C) 500 if r (X,C) p 10, 12 1 ∗ t (X,C) p {r (X,C) r (X,C) otherwise. 12
After all, is the same function, in the mathematical sense (see n. 23), as the
∗ t (X,C)
following non-quasi-additive total reason function:
49r (X,C) r (X,C) if r (X,C) p 10, 12 1 ∗∗ t (X,C) p {r (X,C) r (X,C) otherwise. 12
Therefore, patching together several quasi-additive combinatorial functions does not al-
ways yield a quasi-additive combinatorial function, and so the objection fails.
36. After all, recall (n. 33) how difﬁcult it was to even characterize quasi-additivity.
If it is not even clear how to precisely formulate quasi-additivitywithoutmakingcontentious
assumptions about the nature of the combinatorial function, how could we possibly derive
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the meaning of the relevant terms that the combinatorial function sat-
isﬁes one constraint (that of being quasi-additive), this raises the ques-
tion: why can’t we also know by studying the meaning of the relevant
terms that the combinatorial function satisﬁes various other constraints,
enough of which might reduce it to ﬁnite form? Recall that the majority
of possible combinatorial functions are not quasi-additive. So to require
that the combinatorial function be quasi-additive is a fairly demanding
restriction—a fairly sizable way of cutting down the space of possible
combinatorial functions. Why, then, can’t we appeal to more analytic
truths to cut down the space of possible combinatorial functions even
further? And why couldn’t doing so eventually result in a ﬁnitely ex-
pressible combinatorial function? To insist that we can’t reduce the
combinatorial function to ﬁnite form but can know that it must be quasi-
additive is like insisting, of some number with an inﬁnite, nonrepeating
decimal expansion, that we can’t reduce that number to a ﬁnite formula,
but we can know that a one never directly follows a zero in its inﬁnitely
long decimal expansion.
37 Or closer to home, it is like insisting that,
although we can know from the meaning of the terms involved that
some principle of impartiality holds, that is the only nontrivial, excep-
tionless constraint we can know about rightness and wrongness.
38 How
we come to know that the combinatorial function must be quasi-additive
is beside the point; what matters is that if we accept the right-making
conception and its subsequent requirement that the combinatorial func-
tion be quasi-additive (whether through an appeal to analytic truths or
on some other grounds), then this puts pressure on the particularists’
adherence to noncombinatorialism.
According to a fourth and ﬁnal conception of what it is to be a
reason for action, which we might call the “favoring conception,” a
reason for action is a consideration that counts in favor of a given action,
and a reason against action, one that counts against.
39 The difference
between this and the previous conception is that, whereas with the right-
making conception we said that a reason for performing action X is a
consideration that counts in favor of X being the right thing to do, here we
37. Of course, we can prove similar things about some numbers (e.g., p and e)t h a t
have inﬁnite, nonrepeating decimal expansions, but in those cases there is always some
way of expressing the number in question in a ﬁnite formula.
38. Note that I am not claiming that it is at all plausible that a principle of impartiality
is an analytic truth; rather, what I am claiming is that if such a principle were an analytic
truth, then it would be odd if there were no other analytic moral truths of that sort.
39. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), 186: “The reasons for an action are considerations which count in favor of that
action”; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 17: “Any attempt to explain what it is to be
a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that
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are saying that a reason for performing X is a consideration that counts
in favor of X (full stop). It is tempting to think that at the end of the
day there is little difference between these two conceptions of a reason
for action. However, some philosophers—including many particular-
ists—make a distinction between the “favoring relation” and the “right-
making relation.” Dancy makes the point as follows (although in this
passage he focuses on the alleged difference between the favoring re-
lation and the ought-making relation, the same reasoning, if it works,
can establish a difference between the favoring relation and the right-
making relation):
It seems to me that we are in fact dealing with two normative
relations rather than one. The ﬁrst is the relation between reasons
and ought-judgments; we specify the reasons, and pass to the judg-
ments that we ought to act. The second is a relation between reasons
and action which is not necessarily mediated by any ought at all;
it is the one that is in play when we engage in the sort of practical
reasoning whose “conclusion” is an action. I don’t always think,
“There is this reason for jumping; so I ought to jump”; sometimes
I just think, “There is this reason for jumping; so I’ll jump.” Cru-
cially, the relation between reason and ought-judgment is different
from the relation between reason and action. And it is really the
latter that we are after when we try to understand the notion of a
reason for action—a practical reason.
40
Switching from talk of ought making to talk of right making, the idea
here is that the favoring relation is a relation that holds between a reason
and an action, whereas the right-making relation is a different normative
relation that holds between a reason (or more accurately, a reason-giving
feature) and an action’s rightness or wrongness. However, note that
once one endorses the generalized weighing model of morality (as par-
ticularists do), then feature F is a right-making feature of action X in
circumstance C if and only if the fact that X would have F if performed
in C is a reason for performing X—and so, on the favoring conception,
counts in favor of X. Thus, even if technically the favoring and right-
making relations are different relations, within the generalized weighing
framework the favoring and right-making conceptions of a reason for
action amount to much the same thing.
However, suppose I am wrong here, so that the favoring conception
40. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 22–23. Dancy later makes it clear (78–79) that he
intends there to be an analogous difference between the favoring relation and the right-
making relation. This idea that there is a distinctive type of practical reasoning whose
conclusion is an action, though Aristotelian in origin, has its modern roots in G. E. M.
Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957); for criticism of the idea, see Judith Jarvis
(Thomson), “Practical Reasoning,” Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1962): 316–28.134 Ethics October 2007
is, in fact, a distinct conception of what it is to be a reason for action;
even then the particularists’ noncombinatorialism bars them from being
able to hold the favoring conception. The idea behind this claim is as
follows. Let us suppose there is a distinct type of practical reasoning
that ends in an action, rather than a theoretical conclusion about what
it would be right to do (or what one ought to do). Then, given the
generalized weighing framework, which action is the correct conclusion
of that piece of practical reasoning is determined by the weight and
valence of the reasons that are (or should be) appealed to in that bit
of reasoning. So, just as there is a combinatorial function that takes as
input the valences and weights of the reasons present in a given situation
and outputs the rightness and wrongness of the actions available in that
situation, there is a combinatorial function that takes as input the va-
lences and weights of the reasons that are (or should be) appealed to
in a given piece of practical reasoning and outputs the action (or ac-
tions) that are the correct conclusions of that reasoning. And just as
particularists hold that the ﬁrst of these combinatorial functions is not
ﬁnitely expressible, they no doubt would also hold that the second of
these combinatorial functions is not ﬁnitely expressible—and in partic-
ular not additive in form. So we can run an argument exactly parallel
to the one used to show that particularists cannot hold the right-making
conception in order to establish that they cannot hold the favoring
conception either.
All of which raises the question: what exactly do particularists think
reasons for action are? Their holism about reasons for action blocks
them from being able to hold the isolation and removal conceptions
of a reason for action, and their noncombinatorialism blocks them from
being able to hold the right-making and favoring conceptions. But then
the particularists’ notion of a reason for action is mysterious indeed.
41
VI. GIVING UP NONCOMBINATORIALISM? OR MOVING
BEYOND WEIGHING?
I have just argued that if particularists accept both holism and noncom-
binatorialism, they are left with no coherent notion of a reason for
41. Does the argument just given assume that one must be able to give a reductive
account of reasons for action? No, it does not. I was intentionally silent about whether
the proposed conceptions involved reducing reasons to more fundamental notions or
whether they allowed for the possibility that some of the terms in the account of a reason
might not be deﬁnable except in terms of a reason. Thus, even if, following Scanlon, one
endorses the favoring conception of a reason but insists that the favoring relation can be
cashed out only in terms of the being-a-reason-for relation (so that one is a primitivist about
both reasons and the favoring relation), it still follows that one is not entitled to adhere to
the favoring conception unless the combinatorial function is quasi-additive, and that is all I
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action. One natural line of response to this argument is as follows:
“According to you, particularists can’t endorse holism and noncombi-
natorialism at the same time. But who says they need to endorse both
theses? Indeed, it seems that particularists can get most of what they
want out of their position by accepting one of those two theses while
denying the other. So in particular, since particularists spend a good
deal more time discussing holism than they do discussing noncombi-
natorialism, why can’t particularists maintain their allegiance to holism
but give up any commitment to noncombinatorialism?”
42
It is indeed open to particularists to adopt such a position, but I
doubt that many true particularists would. One of the main forces driv-
ing some philosophers to become particularists is a general suspicion
about the usefulness and value of the traditional quest for true and
exceptionless moral principles, and if holism is true but noncombina-
torialism is not, then there remains a signiﬁcant place in ethics for at
least one portion of that traditional quest. Given the three-level gen-
eralized weighing model of morality to which particularists are com-
mitted, there are three basic categories of moral principles explaining
how the facts at one of the model’s three levels are determined in
general by the facts at one of the more basic levels:
underlying-to-contributory principles: principles specifying how in general
the nonnormative facts at the underlying level determine the
facts about the valences and weights of individual reasons at the
contributory level,
contributory-to-overall principles: principles specifying how in general the
facts about the valences and weights of individual reasons at the
contributory level determine the facts about the rightness and
wrongness of the available actions at the overall level, and
underlying-to-overall principles: principles specifying how in general the
nonnormative facts at the underlying level determine the facts
about the rightness and wrongness of the available actions at the
overall level.
Thus, if particularists give up their noncombinatorialism, they must
42. One way of strengthening this objection would involve pointing out that we can
distinguish between two forms of holism: valence holism, according to which the nonnor-
mative features that give rise to reasons of one valence in one context also give rise to
reasons of a different valence in other contexts, and weight holism, according to which the
nonnormative features that give rise to reasons of one weight in one context also give
rise to reasons of differing weights in other contexts. Then one could insist that, as long
as they endorse both valence holism and weight holism, particularists have no need to
accept noncombinatorialism. However, even when the objection has been strengthened
in this way, my reply is the same since valence and weight holism both only concern how
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admit the existence of true and exceptionless contributory-to-overall
principles. Moreover, debates about which contributory-to-overall prin-
ciples are the correct ones will be instances of precisely the sort of moral
theorizing that particularists are loath to engage in.
For example, suppose particularists concede that there is an ad-
ditive combinatorial function. That does not yet settle the question of
what the proper contributory-to-overall principles are, for there are
many different additive combinatorial functions—many different ways
of assigning rightness and wrongness to the actions available in a given
context on the basis of comparing the total sum of reason in favor of
each. This leaves us with questions like the following. Is the true additive
combinatorial function a maximizing combinatorial function (so that
the right actions in a given context are those with the greatest sum of
reason in their favor), or is it a satisﬁcing combinatorial function (so
that the right actions are those with a suitable amount of total reason
in their favor)? If the true combinatorial function involves satisﬁcing,
does it involve “absolute-level satisﬁcing” (so that the amount of total
reason in favor of an action that makes for rightness is the same in every
context), or “comparative satisﬁcing” (so that an action is right in a
given context if and only if the total reason in its favor is greater than
the total reason in favor of a reasonable percentage of the other available
actions)? If the true combinatorial function involves maximizing, how
does it handle situations in which the total reason function has no
maximum (so that for every action that the agent might perform, there
is another available action with a greater sum of reason in its favor)?
Should we be worried that a maximizing additive combinatorial function
would make morality too demanding (since for almost every action that
any of us actually perform, there exists an alternate action with a slightly
greater sum of reason in its favor that we could have performed instead)?
And so on: these types of questions should look familiar, for they are
exactly the sorts of issues that face consequentialists when they try to
settle, for a given set of available actions, the connection between the
total intrinsic value of each action’s consequences and the overall right-
ness and wrongness of those actions.
43 Moreover, just as particularists
are dubious of the analogous debates in the consequentialist literature,
so too are they likely to be deeply suspicious of this sort of back and
43. On maximizing versus satisﬁcing versions of consequentialism, see Michael Slote,
Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism(London:Routledge &KeganPaul,1985),chap.
3. On absolute-level versus comparative satisﬁcing, see Thomas Hurka, “Two Kinds of
Satisﬁcing,” Philosophical Studies 59 (1990): 107–11. On the worry that a maximizingversion
of consequentialism might make morality too demanding, see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of
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forth over the most plausible version of an additive combinatorial func-
tion.
Matters are not helped if instead particularists insist that there exists
a ﬁnitely expressible combinatorial function that is not additive in struc-
ture. To see this, consider two examples of works that spend some time
searching for a nonadditive combinatorial function. In the penultimate
chapter of The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel goes through great
effort to show that the theory of reasons defended in his book need
not be a version of consequentialism, and he does this by proposing
various nonadditive ‘combinatorial principles’ that specify how the rea-
sons present in a given situation determine one’s overall duty—or in
other words, does so by proposing various nonadditive, ﬁnitely express-
ible combinatorial functions. And in What We Owe to Each Other,T .M .
Scanlon develops an elaborate contractualist theory of how rightness
and wrongness is determined by the reasons present in a given circum-
stance—or in other words, develops a distinctively contractualist com-
binatorial function. But again, these works are instances of exactly the
kind of moral theorizing that particularists are supposed to be suspicious
of. What particularists really want is to insist that there is something
misguided about Nagel and Scanlon’s quest for true and illuminating
contributory-to-overall principles, not to engage in a debate with Nagel
and Scanlon over the particular merits and faults of their respective
positions.
For this reason, I doubt that many true particularists would be
content to simply renege on their noncombinatorialism. What recourse
does this leave them, then, if they accept what I have argued here? I
think a better option—though ultimately a far more radical one—would
be for particularists to turn their back on the generalized weighing
framework altogether. What underwrote that framework was a certain
analogy, either with a literal weighing of elements on a scale or with
physical forces acting on particles. Particularists want to move as far
from those two analogies as possible while still working within the gen-
eralized weighing framework, but if my arguments are correct, there is
a certain sense in which those analogies are essential to the weighing
framework, a certain sense in which talk of reasons combining to de-
termine the overall status of actions commits one to preserving those
analogies, at least to some degree. Deviate too far from a strict analogy
with weighing or with physical forces, and the framework falls apart. So
perhaps particularists, if they want to preserve their general skepticism
about our ability to limn the true and ultimate structure of the moral
realm, should abandon talk of individual reasons or at least should give
up the idea that reasons are the fundamental normative units that de-
termine all other normative properties and relations.
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moral realm that particularists wind up endorsing at the end of the day.
On their picture, we can be completely conﬁdent that the proper meta-
physics of morals has exactly three layers to it: the underlying level
consisting in the nonnormative facts, the contributory level consisting
in the facts about reasons and their valences and weights, and the overall
level consisting in the facts about whatever normative properties and
relations (such as rightness and wrongness) are determined by the in-
terplay of those reasons. Also on this picture, we can be completely
conﬁdent that we will never be able to fully discern the way in which
the second level depends on the ﬁrst, and the third level on the second.
But why should there only be three layers to the picture? Why couldn’t
there be four levels, so that the values of the being-a-reason-for relation
at the second level determine the values of some other normative re-
lation at a third level, which in turn determine the overall moral status
of the available actions at the ﬁnal level? And if four, why not ﬁve or
six or seven levels? And once we’ve started adding new levels to the
picture, why aren’t we on the road toward explicating the moral world,
in the way in which natural science explains molecules in terms of atoms,
atoms in terms of quarks, and quarks in terms of . . . ?
Thus, I think it would be more in keeping with the general senti-
ment behind particularism to cut out the middleman and drop all talk
of individual reasons—or at least drop the claim that properties of rea-
sons always determine the rightness and wrongness of actions. If one
really wants to be a ‘holist’, in the true sense of that term, about nor-
mativity and claim that what normative properties a given feature has
depends on every other feature of the situation at hand (on the whole
situation, as we might put it), then any attempt to isolate individual
normative elements—call them ‘reasons’—in that situation will be ar-
tiﬁcial at best; really it is the entire situation, not any subportion of it,
that gives a particular action the overall normative status that it has.
(Recall the claims of holists about conﬁrmation that it is an entire system
of belief that is conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed, not individual portions of
that system.) So perhaps what particularists really want, rather than the
sort of three-level view they defend, is a two-level view according to which
we have ﬁrst the underlying level consisting of the nonnormative facts
and then a second level consisting of whatever normative facts there
may be, which obtain in virtue of the facts at the underlying level in an
uncodiﬁable manner.
The problem with adopting this line, though, is that it deprives
particularists of the existing arguments for their view—if we give up the
generalized weighing framework and its assumptions that there are such
things as individual reasons that determine other normative properties
like rightness and wrongness, we lose the particularists’ way of estab-
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exceptionless moral principles. But this, I am sometimes inclined to
think, is the fundamental problem with the particularist program. The
guiding thought behind particularism is that ultimately the normative
is incapable of being codiﬁed in an illuminating way, but how can we
learn enough about the normative to know this without codifying the
normative in at least one way? What particularists need is to provide
enough structure to the moral realm for their arguments to get a grip,
without thereby undermining their eventual conclusion that ﬁnite
minds such as ours can never completely discern the true nature of that
realm, and how to achieve that balancing trick is not easy to see. Thus,
in the end I suspect that problems analogous to those raised in this
article will face any attempt to give a positive argument for a view that
is true to the spirit of particularism. That, by itself, does not mean that
such a view must be false, but it does suggest that if the real position
particularists are after is true, there is no way we could ever establish
its truth.